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REDISCOVERING THE NONDELEGATION
DOCTRINE THROUGH A UNIFIED
SEPARATION OF POWERS THEORY
Travis H. Mallen*
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does
come, however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked dis-
regard of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested
assertion of authority.
Justice Felix Frankfurter1
INTRODUCTION
The nondelegation doctrine has proven a seemingly unlimited
topic for scholarly comment. In the last decade, no fewer than fifty
articles have been published on the subject, 2 though this figure is
probably an understatement. Such scholarly attention is curious given
the remarkable stability of the doctrine. Perhaps this is because of the
courts' reluctance to invoke the nondelegation doctrine as a meaning-
ful check on legislative or executive power.
Since 1928, when the Supreme Court first articulated the "intelli-
gible principle" test as the measurement standard for delegated legis-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School 2006; B.S., Political
Science, Arizona State University, 1999. I would like to thank my wife, Christy, my
dearest love and friend, my children, Caitlin Rose and Liam, my inspiration and my
joy, for their unfailing support and patience. Thank you to Erin Gallagher and Andy
Demko, whose suggestions helped me to focus this Note and improve its clarity and
organization greatly. Thanks also to the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for
their efforts to bring this Note to publication. Finally, I would like to thank Professor
Paolo Carozza for his valuable comments in the early drafts of this Note and Professor
Patricia Bellia, whose Constitutional Law course sparked my curiosity for finding
principled answers to constitutional problems.
I Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
2 Based on a search of Westlaw's database of 'Journals & Law Reviews Com-
bined" (JLR) in August 2005 for article titles from the last ten years which include the
terms "intelligible principle," "nondelegation doctrine," or "delegation doctrine."
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lative power,3 the Court has only invoked this test to strike down a
federal law on two occasions, both times involving the same law.4
Even in those cases, the use of the intelligible principle test was either
irreconcilable with subsequent application of the test or of questiona-
ble precedential value. 5 Prior to the intelligible principle test, the
Court had never struck down a federal law on the basis of the
nondelegation doctrine.
Despite its lack of use, the nondelegation doctrine remains an
acknowledged limit on legislative power flowing from the principles of
separation of powers. Its importance as a limit, however, has been
minimal, even while the nondelegation doctrine itself assumes special
importance in the modern administrative state.
This Note argues that the nondelegation doctrine's lack of im-
portance within broader separation of powers principles is a result of
the intelligible principle test. This is so because the intelligible princi-
ple test itself is divorced from other separation of powers principles,
such as those found in the political question doctrine, the limits on
independent executive power, and bicameralism. To remedy this
weakness, this Note argues that the intelligible principle test should
be abandoned and replaced by a new test for measuring the limits to
the nondelegation doctrine. This test, the ancillary powers test, is de-
rived from the broader principles of separation of powers, which rec-
ognize both judicial deference to co-equal branches of the
government and limits on judicial competence. The ancillary powers
test examines the delegation of legislative power by Congress within
the framework of independent power held by the Executive and Judi-
ciary. In doing so, it allows for maximum judicial deference, while at
the same time providing a meaningful limit on congressional
delegation.
Part I begins by summarizing both the origins and the contours
of the intelligible principle test. It continues by illustrating the weak-
nesses of the intelligible principle test as an articulation of separation
of powers principles. Finally, drawing on these principles, Part I
presents the ancillary powers test in full. Part II provides a practical
application of the ancillary powers test in the context of foreign trade,
an area with a deep historical connection to both the nondelegation
3 J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 404-09 (1928).
4 See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (in-
validating section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, Pub. L.
No. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 196); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (invalidat-
ing section 9(c) of the National Industrial Recovery Act ofJune 16, 1933, Pub. L. No.
73-67, 48 Stat. 195, 200).
5 See discussion infra Part I.B.
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doctrine and the intelligible principle test. By applying the ancillary
powers test to sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Part II
demonstrates the ancillary powers test's flexible approach to defining
the outer limits of delegated power in differing situations as well as its
superiority over the intelligible principle test as a meaningful articula-
tion of the nondelegation doctrine.
I. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The nondelegation doctrine is a function of separation of pow-
ers. It recognizes that only Congress may legislate in the true sense of
the word. Above all, legislating, in its truest sense, means that only
Congress may make the initial policy choice to govern a particular
field. This is what it means to be a legislator: deciding when, on what
subject, and how to govern. No one could deny that while executive
and administrative rulemaking is lawmaking, it is not legislating be-
cause the Executive acts after Congress has chosen to govern in the
first instance. The Judiciary also engages in substantive lawmaking
through the common law and statutory interpretation, as well as pro-
cedural lawmaking when it establishes rules of procedure or evidence,
whether through the Rules Enabling Act 6 or the common law. This is
not legislating in the truest sense as it involves either the courts' inter-
pretive function or supervisory power. Whether judicial lawmaking
involves statutory or common law interpretation or the exercise of su-
pervisory power, Congress has either chosen to act in the first instance
or the lawmaking is an inherent function of the Judiciary.
Any time Congress passes a law, it effectively delegates some law-
making to the Executive, the Judiciary, or both, as either or both will
be called upon to interpret that law, either in its execution or applica-
tion. This sort of delegation does not offend the nondelegation doc-
trine because, while it involves a delegation of lawmaking power, it
does not turn judges or bureaucrats into legislators: those charged
with making the initial decision to govern a particular field. While
there is room for disagreement over where judicial or executive inter-
pretation ceases to in fact "interpret" a properly enacted statute and
become legislating, this does not make the initial delegation an imper-
missible delegation, nor can restrictive interpretation cure an other-
wise impermissible delegation. 7
6 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (2000)).
7 In Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2002), the Court stated
that the exercise of any discretion under an impermissible delegation of power
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The line between creating legislators and delegating some legisla-
tive authority to those charged with executing or interpreting a law
may be a fine one, but it is an important distinction for separation of
powers purposes. The Court has tried to identify this line through the
intelligible principle test, which focuses on the amount of discretion
the law leaves for execution or interpretation. Such a distinction,
however, is not founded in separation of powers principles, which
look at institutional competence-the type not the amount of discre-
tion granted. At the same time, following separation of powers princi-
ples, which focus on competence, the courts are slow to judge when a
grant of discretion is too much. By divorcing the nondelegation doc-
trine from separation of powers' traditional focus on competence, the
intelligible principle test virtually assures that no law will ever be
found to have violated the nondelegation doctrine. These weaknesses
are addressed below in Part I.B.
To answer the weaknesses of the intelligible principle test, this
Note proposes an alternative mode of analysis for the nondelegation
doctrine: the ancillary powers test. The ancillary powers test over-
comes the intelligible principle test's weaknesses by refocusing
nondelegation analyses on the heart of separation of powers: institu-
tional competence.8
A. The "Intelligible Principle" Test: A Brief Recap
The Court first recognized the nondelegation doctrine as a con-
stitutional principle in Field v. Clark.9 In Field, the Court upheld a
challenge to the Tariff Act of 189010 allowing the President to impose
tariffs on certain commodities when the President found a country
was exacting a "reciprocally unequal and unreasonable" duty on U.S.
"would itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority." Id. at 473. Accord-
ing to the Court, an agency's interpretation of a statute has no bearing on whether
the statute in question impermissibly delegates legislative power, which is a question
for the courts. Id. Whether a statute violates the nondelegation doctrine by imper-
missibly delegating legislative power is determined from the statute itself, not from
agency interpretations. Following this logic, because a statute impermissibly delegat-
ing legislative power cannot be saved by agency interpretation, an overly broad agency
interpretation of a statute that effectively results in impermissible delegation of legis-
lative power does not affect whether the courts will find that the statute itself dele-
gates legislative power.
8 See infra Part I.C.
9 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) ("That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to
the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and mainte-
nance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.").
10 Ch. 1244, § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612.
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agricultural products." The statute went on to prescribe the tariffs
the President was required to impose in such cases.1 2 The Court en-
gaged in an exhaustive survey of similar statutes enacted since the
Washington Administration.13 Most of these statutes involved recipro-
cal treatment of goods based on the actions of foreign governments or
provided sanctions in response to military aggression, such as viola-
tions of American neutrality by warring nations.' 4 These sorts of stat-
utes have been subsequently described as contingent legislation,
whereby upon the President's proclamation of a certain state of af-
fairs, or condition precedent, a legislatively prescribed response
follows. 15
In Field, the Court upheld the Tariff Act of 1890 holding that
Congress, not the President, had exercised all of the legislative power
in question. 16 Specifically, Congress established the contingency
under which duty-free treatment of certain commodities would be sus-
pended, set the rate imposed in case of such contingency, and only
left enforcement of this policy to the President, referring to the Presi-
dent as a "mere agent of the law-making department" for purpose of
finding a particular set of facts. 17
The next major step defining both the nondelegation doctrine
and the President's powers in the area of tariffs came in J. W. Hamp-
ton, Jr., & Co. v. United States. 8 Like the Tariff Act of 1890, the chal-
lenged statute permitted the President to increase tariffs upon finding
a specific condition precedent, in this case that the tariffs imposed by
law failed to equalize the differences in costs of production between
the United States and the exporting country.' 9 The President was
then required to determine the differences in production costs and
increase the tariff to equalize the costs. 20 The Court found that Con-
gress intended that duties should equalize costs of production.21 The
Court recognized the difficulty Congress would face in identifying and
fixing every rate to meet this goal. 22 Under this standard, so long as
Congress laid down an intelligible principle as well as its policy and
11 Field, 143 U.S. at 680.
12 Id. at 681.
13 Id. at 681-89.
14 Id.
15 See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472, 479 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
16 143 U.S. at 693.
17 Id.
18 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
19 Id. at 401.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 404.
22 Id. at 407.
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plan, and one branch did not assume the constitutional field of an-
other, no forbidden delegation occurred. 23
In the sixty years following J. W Hampton, the Court elaborated
on the functions of the nondelegation doctrine and the intelligible
principle test's role in supporting it.24 First, the nondelegation doc-
trine ensures that the most important social policies are made by Con-
gress. 25 Next, when Congress does delegate authority, it must provide
an "intelligible principle" to guide the exercise of the delegated
power.2 6 This "intelligible principle," in turn, provides the courts with
a standard against which to measure the exercise of the delegated
power. 27 That is, it allows courts to evaluate whether the Executive
has stayed within the discretion granted by Congress. If, on the other
hand, the courts cannot discern the limits to the Executive's discre-
tion, that is if Congress fails to provide an "intelligible principle," Con-
gress has overstepped the nondelegation doctrine.
B. The Limits of Current Separation of Powers Doctrines
Since 1928, the Court has only invoked the nondelegation doc-
trine to invalidate a statute on two occasions, and both cases dealt with
the same act. The first case, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,28 has been
criticized as irreconcilable with both previous and subsequent deci-
sions.29 The second case, A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,30 is not good precedent in other ways.
First, commentators have described the delegation in Schechter as
"the most sweeping congressional delegation of all time."3' 1 The
Schechter Court, however, focused on the vagueness and lack of stan-
dards identifiable in section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act
that could serve as an intelligible principle. The Court described sec-
tion 3 as nothing more than "general aims of rehabilitation, correc-
tion, and expansion. '3 2 These "general aims," however, were certainly
no less "intelligible" than such standards as "in the public interest"
23 Id. at 404-09.
24 See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 685.
26 Id. at 685-86.
27 Id. at 686.
28 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
29 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RicHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 2.6, at 71 (3d ed. 1994).
30 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
31 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 29, § 2.6, at 71.
32 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 541-42.
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and 'just and reasonable," which the Court has sustained since
Schechter.3' Additionally, in Schechter the Court struck down the statute
on separate Commerce Clause grounds,3 4 applying the formalistic "di-
rect versus indirect" impact test for interstate commerce long since
abandoned by the Court.3 5 The Court's reliance on alternate grounds
to decide the case gives its discussion of unconstitutional delegation of
power the characteristics of obiter dicta, particularly given the some-
what tautological manner in which the Court declared the standards
lacking an "intelligible principle." 36
Because of the Court's failure to follow Panama Refining and
Schechter in subsequent cases coupled with the absence of any guiding
principles in these two cases, it is unsurprising that many commenta-
tors and even the courts have come to view the nondelegation doc-
trine as "moribund."3 7 Some commentators have gone so far as to
declare that the nondelegation doctrine has never in fact existed. 38
Of course, the nondelegation doctrine does exist, at least nomi-
nally. The Court continues to reaffirm the nondelegation doctrine as
a function of separation of powers limiting Congress in its delegation
of power.39 While nominally recognizing the intelligible principle test
as the proper test for deciding whether a statute satisfies the nondele-
33 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 29, § 2.6, at 72.
34 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 551.
35 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) ("[E]ven if appellee's activity
be local ... it may still... be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic
effect on interstate commerce,... irrespective of whether such effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'").
36 See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 541-42 ("In view of the scope of that broad declara-
tion, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the
President ... is virtually unfettered.").
37 See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53
(1974) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The notion that the Constitution narrowly con-
fines the power of Congress to delegate authority to administrative agencies, which
was briefly in vogue in the 1930's, has been virtually abandoned by the Court for all
practical purposes . . . ."); Steven F. Huefner, The Supreme Court's Avoidance of the
Nondelegation Doctrine in Clinton v. City of New York: More than "A Dime's Worth of
Difference, " 49 CATH. U. L. REX. 337, 337 (2000) ("In the ensuing six decades, the
doctrine has come to be seen as 'moribound' as a tool for enforcing a proper separa-
tion of legislative and executive power. ....).
38 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1722 (2002) (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine has never
existed and that no support for the theory exists in the text, structure, or original
understanding of the Constitution).
39 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001) (up-
holding the Clean Air Act's ambient air quality provisions); Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipe-
line Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1989) (upholding the Federal Power Commission's
authority to set pipeline fees); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989)
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gation doctrine, 40 the Court has failed to provide any guidance for
identifying an intelligible principle. Instead, the Court has focused
on whether the statute provided standards against which a court
would measure the Executive's action.41 While standards like "in the
public interest" provide some criterion against which a court could
measure executive action, it does not provide criterion as to what is, in
fact, "in the public interest," except perhaps by negative implication
(for instance by looking at whether ,the Executive acted solely for the
private benefit of an individual). That is not to say that such broad
standards necessarily offend the nondelegation doctrine, it is only to
say that recognizing them as intelligible principles is too charitable.
In Mistretta v. United States, the Court went so far as to recognize
that the nondelegation doctrine has become little more than a tool of
statutory construction, employed to narrow delegations to avoid con-
stitutional problems. 42 The Court added that its primary concern in
nondelegation cases, in particular, and separation of powers cases,
generally, was preventing encroachment by one branch upon the pow-
ers of another, and the resulting aggrandizement. 43 This general con-
cern of separation of powers-encroachment and aggrandizement at
the expense of a coordinate branch of government-deals primarily
with institutional competence. In contrast, by asking solely whether
Congress provided a coordinate branch of government with enough
guidance in a statute, the intelligible principle test focuses on the
amount of discretion granted one coordinate branch of government
by another. If, in fact, the nondelegation doctrine is about separation
of powers and separation of powers is about encroachment and ag-
grandizement, the intelligible principle test is a poor measure of
whether Congress has overstepped its authority to delegate some legis-
lative power. This is so because the intelligible principle test has never
approached the question of encroachment and aggrandizement be-
cause it does not look at independent sources of power.
In truth, the canon of constitutional avoidance animates the
Court's nondelegation jurisprudence, not the fundamental principles
of institutional competence underlying other separation of powers
problems, such as bicameralism, presentment, and political questions.
Rather than face the conflicting separation of powers principles of
(upholding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a permissible delegation of legisla-
tive power).
40 Am. Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472; Skinner, 490 U.S. at 218-19; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at
371-72.
41 Skinner, 490 U.S. at 218-19; Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 379.
42 488 U.S. at 373 n.7.
43 Id. at 382.
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due respect for coordinate branches of government 44 and adherence
to formal limitations on the powers of each branch,45 the courts avoid
the question by characterizing the entire nondelegation question as
one of discretion through their reliance on the intelligible principle
test.
No other separation of powers question is characterized in terms
of discretion. For example, while judicially manageable standards-
criterion against which courts may measure adherence to a statutory
or constitutional mandate-are an important separation of powers
question with respect to the courts, 4 6 they do not measure the amount
of discretion given to courts. Rather, judicially manageable standards
recognize the institutional competence of courts to make certain deci-
sions under Article III, which limits the courts' competence to resolv-
ing cases and controversies. 47 These judicially manageable standards
recognize the far more limited role of courts in lawmaking. They rec-
ognize the courts' subordinate role in making policy decisions, a re-
flection on the courts' institutional competence. Absence of a
judicially manageable standard may take a case or controversy out of
the judicial power of the courts through the political question doc-
trine, but this is because of limits on institutional competence not be-
cause the issue confers too much discretion on the courts. The
inquiry in the case of judicially manageable standards focuses on the
type of question the courts are asked to resolve, not the range within
which the courts may resolve the question.
The reason for the Court's troubles in managing the nondelega-
tion doctrine has been the intelligible principle test. The intelligible
principle test is based on the flawed assumption that separation of
powers and nondelegation prohibit any lawmaking by the Executive.
It distinguishes discretion in execution of the law from discretion in
creating the content of the law. 48 Not only is this a distinction without
a difference, 49 but it ignores the fundamental concern of separation
of powers: institutional competence.
44 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
45 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) ("To preserve [constitu-
tional checks on the legislative process], and maintain the separation of powers, the
carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch must not be eroded.").
46 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329
U.S. 90, 105 (1946)); Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
47 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
48 See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693-94 (1982) (quoting Cincinnati, Wilming-
ton & Zanesville R.R. Co. v. Comm'rs of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852)).
49 For example, section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act makes use of "any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the pub-
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The intelligible principle test is also overly simplistic in defining
powers. While the Constitution vests all legislative power in the Con-
gress 50 and all executive power in the President, 5 1 the Court has rec-
ognized that some powers fall within a "twilight zone" of concurrent
authority.52 In areas of this concurrent authority, the Court has de-
clined to invoke a general rule of nondelegation, 53 recognizing that in
such cases the President's power is at its height, embodying all of the
presidency's independent power plus all of the power Congress may
delegate in that area.54
The Court added to the confusion by completely ignoring the
intelligible principle test and nondelegation doctrine in Clinton v. City
of New York. 55 In Clinton, the Court invalidated the Line Item Veto Act
of 199656 for failure to conform to the constitutional presentment and
bicameralism mandates. 57 The dissent emphasized that the Act did
not actually allow the President to change the text of law, but merely
allowed the President to refrain from execution under certain circum-
stances.5 8 In his dissent, Justice Breyer took the majority to task for
failure to uphold the Act under the nondelegation doctrine, particu-
larly in light of equally broad standards found to satisfy the intelligible
principle test.59 Justice Scalia went further, stating that the Act's title
had "faked out" the Court, leading it to invalidate the law when it was
substantively no different than other grants of power the Court had
upheld in the past.60
lic interest" unlawful. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(2000). This statute expressly instructs the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to exercise its discretion in the execution of the law to determine the law's
content. Clearly, by promulgating rules under this law, the SEC is executing the law,
thus any discretion exercised is merely in the law's execution. On the other hand, the
law's content is made by reference to the rules promulgated pursuant to the law itself.
Thus, to execute the law, the SEC must effectively write the law. Where execution
stops and creation begins proves to be a difficult question to answer.
50 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
51 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
52 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
53 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 (1996); United States v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322 (1936).
54 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-36.
55 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
56 Pub. Law No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200.
57 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 448.
58 Id. at 474-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 484-96.
60 Id. at 465-69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Not only did the Court not address the nondelegation doctrine,
but it went to great lengths to distinguish the Act from the facts of
Field. The Court emphasized that Field involved no discretion on the
part of the President, and thus involved mere execution of the law.6 1
The Court also pointed out that Field did not involve a challenge
under the Presentment Clause. 62 While the Court effectively distin-
guished the Act from Field, it failed to distinguish the Act from subse-
quent nondelegation cases employing broad application of the
nondelegation doctrine.
This was for good reason. On a purely technical level, the Court
could not distinguish the vast discretion the Act gave the President
from prior nondelegation cases. Technically, the Act did not grant
the President the power to change the text of a bill, but instead gave
the President the power to prevent certain expenditures or tax bene-
fits from having legal force and effect. 63 The Court would have had
great trouble distinguishing this discretion from the discretion to pre-
vent duty-free treatment of certain goods from having prospective
force and effect, as in Field. Further, the Court would be hard pressed
to distinguish the factors governing the President's exercise of this
cancellation power, such as that the cancellation would not "harm the
national interest, '64 from similarly broad discretion upheld under the
intelligible principle test.
Despite these technical distinctions between the Act's cancella-
tion power and a true line item veto, the Court correctly identified the
true effect of the cancellation power: to alter the content of a duly
enacted law by refusing to give legal effect to its provisions. The Presi-
dent simply lacks the institutional competence to make law out of
whole cloth, to behave as a legislator by deciding when and on what
subjects to legislate, in this case, by effectively repealing a properly
enacted law. The problem, as Justices Breyer and Scalia correctly
pointed out, was that the Court could not rely on the nondelegation
doctrine to support its decision without holding that the standards
governing the exercise of the cancellation power failed the intelligible
principle test. The Court could not hold that the Act lacked an intelli-
gible principle while remaining consistent with its earlier
jurisprudence.
61 Id. at 443-44 (majority opinion).
62 Id. at 444 n.36.
63 Id. at 474-75 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 436 (majority opinion) (quoting the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200).
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The problem with relying on the Presentment and Bicameralism
Clauses, however, is that the Court relied on formal constitutional re-
quirements while at the same time ignoring the formal requirements
of the Act, which did not technically repeal a duly enacted law, even if
that was the practical effect. As a result, the Court's decision was in-
ternally inconsistent in its application of formalistic distinctions.
While reaching the correct result, the Court was left grasping for an
ultimately unsatisfactory explanation for why it reached that result.
C. Finding the Nondelegation Doctrine in Separation of Powers Principles:
Ancillary Powers as a Limiting Principle
In Clinton, the Court reached the correct result as a matter of
separation of powers, but it could only do so by ignoring its entire line
of nondelegation doctrine jurisprudence. Effectively, the Court had
to choose between distinct lines of separation of powers jurisprudence
and its attempt to fit Clinton into the proper separation of powers
mold. By dividing separation of powers into discrete doctrines, such
as nondelegation and bicameralism and presentment, and developing
the doctrines independently,6 5 the underlying principles of separation
of powers become lost as the doctrines grow further apart
jurisprudentially.
These underlying separation of powers principles are best articu-
lated in the political question doctrine, itself a function of separation
of powers66 : preventing aggrandizement of one branch at the expense
of another. 67 As far as judicial application of these principles, this
boils down to respect for coordinate branches of government, stan-
dards against which to measure the conduct of one branch against
other branches, 68 and a recognition that the Constitution envisions
interaction between the various branches, circumscribed by the Con-
stitution taken as a whole. 69
Justice Jackson's now-famous formulation of executive power in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer70 neatly embodies each of the
above principles, and has come to define how the Court evaluates the
65 Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (relying on the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clauses to invalidate the legislative veto), with Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding delegation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to
the United States Sentencing Commission under the intelligible principle test).
66 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
67 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382.
68 See id. at 380-81; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944; Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
69 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 635-38.
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exercise of executive power. 71 Justice Jackson broke executive power
into three categories: (1) circumstances involving express or implied
congressional approval or assent; (2) circumstances involving congres-
sional silence; and (3) circumstances involving express or implied
congressional disapproval. 72 The first category is particularly useful in
defining the contours of the nondelegation doctrine.
When Congress delegates power, it necessarily approves of the
President's actions to act within the scope of the enactment. In such
cases, the President acts with the combined power of the Presidency's
inherent powers and all congressionally delegated power.73 These
acts are given the greatest judicial deference and enjoy a strong pre-
sumption of validity, fully supporting the separation of powers princi-
ple of due respect. 74 Such due respect is not absolute. The
delegation must satisfy the overarching concern of separation of pow-
ers to prevent aggrandizement of one branch of government at the
expense of another in an area in which the first branch lacks indepen-
dent institutional competence. Institutional competence then focuses
on the type of discretion involved: whether Congress has told another
branch of government to fulfill a legislative mandate by exercising
that branch's institutional competence or whether Congress has ex-
panded the institutional competence of another branch wholly apart
from that branch's constitutional mandate.
While the intelligible principle test ostensibly serves this pur-
pose,75 it fails to recognize the full breadth of the Youngstown test.
The intelligible principle test casts the entire question in terms of the
scope of discretion associated with fulfilling a congressional mandate
without accounting for the full amount of independent institutional
competence or range of discretion. In cases of express congressional
approval, the President acts not only under delegated legislative au-
thority, but under independent executive authority, such as that
found in the Vesting Clause 76 or the Take Care Clause. 7 7 These ex-
press bases of executive authority may be further augmented by an
inherent executive power in certain areas, such as foreign relations.
The President's conduct, then, is not defined solely by Congress's
power to delegate, but the combination of the President's indepen-
dent authority and Congress's delegation power.
71 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981).
72 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
73 Id. at 635-36.
74 Id. at 637.
75 See Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1989).
76 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
77 Id. art. II, § 3.
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The intelligible principle test does not recognize these separate
bases of executive authority. Instead, the intelligible principle test,
recognizing that Congress cannot delegate purely legislative power,78
attempts to define the nondelegation doctrine solely along this restric-
tion on congressional power. Seeking to reconcile realities of execu-
tive practice with the prohibition against delegation absent an
intelligible principle, the Court has reduced an intelligible principle
to no more than a general policy statement, assigned to a particular
agency, with some sort of boundaries on the action. 79 In doing so,
however, the Court has virtually eliminated the nondelegation doc-
trine as a tool for enforcing separation of executive and legislative
power.8 0
As the sole test for nondelegation, the intelligible principle test
advances the fiction that administrative rulemaking is not an exercise
of legislative power when it does not involve too much discretion.
This is not the inevitable result of the modern administrative state or
simply judicial recognition of practical realities. This result flows from
the failure of the Court to follow its own articulation of proper separa-
tion of powers principles.
While it is true that Congress cannot delegate purely legislative
power, a true delegation of legislative power means a full transfer of
legislative power by creating legislators.8 1 Such delegation only exists
when nothing constrains the Executive's discretion,8 2 when Congress
grants the Executive a power to act in a manner wholly divorced from
the Executive's independent institutional competencies. The intelligi-
ble principle test confuses this by implying that there must be greater
precision in congressional delegation than separation of powers prin-
ciples require by focusing solely on the scope (or amount) of discre-
tion found in the delegating legislation without accounting for
independent sources of authority (the type of discretion). By focusing
on institutional competence, a complete separation of powers analysis
acknowledges that the type of discretion exercised, not the scope of
discretion, controls the proper exercise of power. The full scope of
discretion encompasses the sum of delegated authority to act within a
given field (such as the power to execute laws or decide a case or
78 SeeJ. W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407-09 (1928).
79 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-73 (1989) (quoting Am. Power
& Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
80 See Huefner, supra note 37, at 337-38.
81 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 419-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN LocKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 87 (R. Cox ed., Harlan-Davidson 1982) (1690));
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 38, at 1726-28.
82 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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controversy) plus any other independent competencies related to that
field which do not require specific authorization before they may be
exercised (such as that of the commander in chief or the courts' su-
pervisory power). The inquiry then becomes: what sort of power has
Congress instructed a coordinate branch of government to exercise in
the first instance?
Rather than recognizing an independent basis for greater execu-
tive discretion, the intelligible principle test permits such broad dis-
cretion, but only through the fiction that Congress has provided
adequate guidance through standards like "in the public interest." By
embracing this fiction and declining to trace the contours of the intel-
ligible principle test, the courts have put themselves in the position of
choosing between finding any delegation satisfies the test or contra-
dicting more than a century of nondelegation jurisprudence, not to
mention running afoul of separation of powers principles themselves
by failing to afford due respect to a coordinate branch of government.
The courts have simply left themselves with no principled alternative.
As a result, the intelligible principle test has swallowed the nondelega-
tion doctrine, rendering it virtually nonexistent. 83
The controlling question in a proper nondelegation analysis is
not the precision of congressional delegation (whether Congress has
enunciated an intelligible principle), but whether that delegation is a
naked delegation of legislative power, unsupported by an indepen-
dent executive power outside of the "faithful" execution of law.8 4 Jus-
tice Scalia recognized this in his dissenting opinion in Mistretta v.
United States.85 The correct test, the ancillary powers test, looks not at
whether Congress has delegated any legislative power or provided an
intelligible principle to guide executive discretion, but whether Con-
gress has called on the Executive to exercise an express or inherent
executive power in connection with the delegated legislative power. 86
So long as the exercise of legislative power is ancillary to the exercise
of an independent executive power, as opposed to a naked delegation
of legislative power, the ancillary powers test is satisfied.
Although, in practice, the ancillary powers test would support
many of the broad delegations upheld under the intelligible principle
test, the larger effect would be to breathe new life into the nondelega-
83 See Huefner, supra note 37, at 337-38.
84 In a strict sense, the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4, does not
grant the President the power to execute laws, but places a specific duty on how the
President should exercise the executive power granted generally by the Vesting
Clause, id. § 1, cl. 1.
85 488 U.S. at 419-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86 See id. at 420-21.
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tion doctrine. Because the intelligible principle test has been
stretched so thin, it cannot be principally applied without overruling
or contradicting every case finding standards such as "in the public
interest" satisfied the test. Under the ancillary powers test, however,
the courts could once again look to the nondelegation doctrine as a
meaningful separation of powers limit and avoid strained application
of other separation of powers limits, such as the use of bicameralism
and presentment in Clinton, while ignoring the proverbial elephant in
the middle of the room.
The ancillary powers test involves three steps. First, the court asks
whether legislative power had been delegated. Statutes, such as the
one involved in Field, with a complete absence of discretion in execu-
tion (where the Executive is a "mere agent" of Congress) would still
fall within the test. Other statutes, those presented in purposive
terms-those which describe a general policy goal, such as the Line
Item Veto Act-which clearly delegate legislative power must proceed
to the second step.
Next, the court must look at whether the law involves the exercise
of an independent executive power. While no mathematical test
could answer this question, the primary inquiry focuses on whether
and under what circumstances the Executive must or may act. Absent
an independent source of executive power beyond the Vesting or
Take Care Clauses (institutional competence), an act crosses the line
between permissible and impermissible delegation when it grants the
Executive the type of discretion reserved to the legislature: the discre-
tion to govern a particular area or not, to make law, in the first in-
stance. Discretion in this sense, the separation of powers sense, is not
on the quantity of discretion, which the intelligible principle test ex-
amines, but the quality of the discretion, the sort of discretion within a
given branch's institutional competence. These powers are in turn
found in the Constitution itself and include powers inherent to that
branch of government.
Although the quality of the discretion may affect the quantity of
discretion which Congress may instruct another branch to execute,
quantity is not the concern of separation of powers, which asks
whether one branch has aggrandized itself at the expense of an-
other-a qualitative question. When one branch acts within the scope
of its institutional competence, it has not aggrandized itself but exer-
cised its own power. On the other hand, when one branch exercises
the powers of another, outside its own institutional competence and
independent of the exercise of one of its own institutional competen-
cies, then it has aggrandized itself at the expense of another.
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The Line Item Veto Act failed this step of the ancillary powers test
because it gave the President complete discretion to act or refrain
from acting and gave no direction as to what sorts of appropriations
or limited tax benefits should be cancelled. This sort of discretion is
legislative discretion in the true sense. It aggrandized the Executive at
the expense of Congress because it both took the power to make these
decisions (to act or not to act) from Congress and effectively left Con-
gress without any means to check the Executive, as the President
could simply veto any act which tried to void the cancelled appropria-
tion or limited tax benefit.
In the final step of the ancillary powers test, if the court finds no
independent executive power, the law must satisfy the bicameralism
and presentment requirements of Chadha to prevent unilateral action
by participants in the lawmaking process. The Line Item Veto Act
would fail this test, not because the cancellation changed the text of a
law, as the Court held,8 7 but because the cancellation itself amounted
to a separate legislative act repealing a duly enacted law88 and aggran-
dized the Presidency at the expense of Congress. It is no argument
that Congress may not care about the aggrandizement. Among Con-
gress's enumerated powers one cannot find the power to create a sec-
ond national legislature in the person of the President.
Because it is founded in broader separation of powers principles,
the ancillary powers test is not limited to legislative-to-executive dele-
gation but includes legislative-to-judiciary delegation. While the exact
contours of inherent executive power may be undefined, 9 the federal
Judiciary's inherent power is limited to its supervisory power, which is
itself derived from its express Article III power to decide cases or con-
troversies. 90 It is for this reason that the otherwise unlimited grant of
authority to develop rules of privilege found in Rule 501 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, as enacted by Congress, 91 does not offend that
87 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998).
88 Id. at 438 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954 (1983)).
89 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926) ("The executive power
was given in general terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was re-
garded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was
needed .... ).
90 See Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) ("In the exercise of
its supervisory authority, a federal court 'may, within limits, formulate procedural
rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress.'" (quoting United
States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983))). While the exact limits of the supervisory
power may be disputed, this inherent power is clearly limited to a court's power to
manage its own proceedings or those of inferior courts. See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-23, at 466 n.2 (3d ed. 2000).
91 Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
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ancillary powers test. While developing rules of privilege, or any other
rule of procedure or evidence, would otherwise fall outside of the
strict case or controversy power, they survive the ancillary powers anal-
ysis because the delegation is coupled with an independent source of
judicial power: the supervisory power to manage rules of evidence and
procedure.
To this point, it may not seem that the ancillary powers test adds
much to the intelligible principle test as far as outcomes. Part II, how-
ever, demonstrates why the ancillary powers test does more than sim-
ply recast the same results by looking at two similar though
fundamentally different statutes involving international trade: sections
20192 and 30193 of the Trade Act of 1974. 94
II. THE INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE TEST IN ACTION: FOREIGN TRADE
International trade provides a convenient frame of analysis for
the ancillary powers test. It involves both the power of Congress to
regulate foreign trade and, in some instances, it implicates the Presi-
dent's foreign relations power. Sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act
of 1974 illustrate this well. While section 201 does not implicate for-
eign relations and was actually intended to be insulated from foreign
policy considerations entirely,95 section 301 directly implicates foreign
relations as it requires the United State Trade Representative (USTR)
to evaluate whether other nations are fulfilling their obligations under
international agreements or otherwise unjustifiably burdening United
States trade through their official acts. 96 This distinction will prove
important for purposes of the ancillary powers analysis, as the former
invokes no recognized independent executive power,9 7 while the lat-
ter directly implicates the President's plenary and exclusive foreign
relations power.98
92 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2254 (2000). For purposes of this Note, "section 201" refers
to sections 201 through 204 of the Trade Act of 1974.
93 Id. §§ 2411-2420 (2000). For purposes of this Note, "section 301" refers to
sections 301 through 310 of the Trade Act of 1974.
94 Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2101-2495).
95 S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 124 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186,
7268.
96 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
97 Indeed, the Court has recognized that Congress has plenary power to regulate
international commerce. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
98 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)
(describing the President's international relations authority as plenary and exclusive).
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This Part begins by outlining the provisions of sections 201 and
301 to provide the proper framework for the ancillary powers analy-
sis.99 It concludes by applying the ancillary powers test to sections 201
and 301 to illustrate its application and demonstrate how the ancillary
powers test provides both deference to the political branches while
preserving the nondelegation doctrine.100
A. The Statutes
1. Section 201: Relief for Domestic Industries
Section 201 empowers the President to impose quantitative re-
strictions, tariffs, or tariff-rate quotas on imports to facilitate positive
adjustment by an industry injured by increased imports. 10 1 The Presi-
dent may do so only after the International Trade Commission
("ITC") determines that the increased imports have been a substantial
cause of serious injury or threatened serious injury to the industry. 10 2
While section 201 requires the President to take all "appropriate and
feasible action within his power" to facilitate positive adjustment, this
requirement is virtually eviscerated by a qualification allowing the
President to engage in a cost-benefit analysis and a subjective determi-
nation of feasibility.' 03 Section 201 lists a number of factors the Presi-
dent must take into account when determining feasibility, but these
factors include such amorphous terms as "factors related to the na-
tional economic interest of the United States."10 4 Any restraints these
factors place on the President's discretion, in terms of when to act,
have-been all but eliminated by the courts. 10 5
While the ITC's finding of serious injury is a condition precedent
to the President's action, the ITC must initiate an investigation at the
request of the President. 10 6 Even though the ITC must initiate investi-
gation under certain other circumstances, 10 7 the fact remains that the
99 See infra Part II.A.
100 See infra Part II.B.
101 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a).
102 Id.
103 Id. § 2253(a)(1).
104 Id. § 2253(a) (2) (F).
105 See Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
("'[T] he President's findings of fact and motivations for his actions are not subject to
review."' (quoting Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed. Cir.
1984))).
106 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b).
107 The ITC must also initiate an investigation at the request of the USTR, upon
receipt of a petition from an entity representing the industry (e.g., trade associations,
labor unions, groups of workers), at the request of the House of Representatives Ways
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President may initiate an investigation at the President's complete
discretion.
The ITC must determine whether increased imports have injured
or threatened injury to the industry and, in the usual and simplest
case, issue the determination within 120 days.108 To find injury, the
ITC must find that an article is
1. being imported in such increased quantities as to
2. constitute a substantial cause of
3. serious injury or threat of serious injury to a domestic industry
4. producing a like or directly competitive article. 10 9
Section 201 defines "substantial cause" as "a cause which is impor-
tant and not less than any other cause," 110 and "serious injury" as "a
significant overall impairment in the position of a domestic indus-
try."11 In identifying serious injury, section 201 directs the ITC to
consider such factors as the significant idling of productive facilities,
the inability of a significant number of domestic firms to carry on pro-
duction at a reasonable level of profit, and significant unemployment
or underemployment in the industry. 112 While section 201 does not
define "like or directly competitive" articles, the committee report ac-
companying the Trade Act explained that these terms meant articles
which are either "substantially identical in inherent or intrinsic char-
acteristics" (like) or "substantially equivalent for commercial pur-
poses" (directly competitive) .113
After finding injury, the ITC must recommend the action it be-
lieves will address the serious injury (or threat of serious injury) 'tnd
be most effective in facilitating positive adjustment.1 14 The ITC then
presents its determination and recommendations (if it found injury)
to the President.1 1 5 If the ITC is equally divided over whether there
and Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee, or upon its own motion.
Id.
108 Id. The ITC has an additional sixty days when the petitioner requests provi-
sional relief, and an additional thirty days if the commission determines that the in-
vestigation is "extraordinarily complicated." Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. § 2252(b)(1)(B).
111 Id. § 2252(c).
112 Id.
113 S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 121-22 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186,
7265-66.
114 19 U.S.C. § 2252(e).
115 Id. § 2252(f).
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has been an injury, the President may consider the ITC to have deter-
mined that the industry suffered injury. 116
The courts afford the ITC's determination almost complete def-
erence. 117 The courts limit their review to "clear misconstruction of
the governing statute, a significant procedural violation, or action
outside [the] delegated authority," leaving the ITC's motivations and
findings of fact entirely unreviewable."18
Once the President receives a determination of injury, the Presi-
dent must take "all appropriate and feasible action within his power
which the President determines will facilitate efforts by the domestic
industry to make a positive adjustment to import competition."1'1 9
While phrased in compulsory terms, this language is devoid of con-
tent. The President's determination under section 201 is subject to
the President's absolute, unreviewable discretion. 120 Because the
courts have precluded themselves from examining the Executive's de-
cision, "all appropriate and feasible action within his power" means
anything the President wishes.
Section 201 makes a perfunctory effort to guide the President's
decisionmaking process, "requiring" the President to consider such
factors as the ITC's recommendations and "factors related to the na-
tional economic interest," such as the social and economic costs on
communities if relief is denied and the impact on consumers and do-
mestic competition if relief is granted. 12 1 None of these considera-
tions are given any decisive, much less conclusive, weight. Combined
with the sheer breadth of these considerations, the lack of any conclu-
sive factors and absence of judicial review grants the President abso-
lute, unfettered authority to grant or deny relief.
This discretion extends with equal force to the form of relief pro-
vided. Section 201 allows the President to choose between nine dis-
tinct forms of relief, including tariffs, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, and
"any other action which may be taken by the President under author-
ity of law and which the President considers appropriate and feasible,"
as well as any combination of these forms of relief.' 22 Although sec-
tion 201 places certain limits on the nature of the relief, these limits
operate primarily as outer limits on the duration and quantity of re-
116 19 U.S.C.A. § 1330(d)(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2005).
117 See Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
118 Id.
119 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1) (A).
120 See Maple Leaf 762 F.2d at 89.
121 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a).
122 Id.
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lief.123 Despite these limits, the same criteria for finding injury guide
the President's selection of type, quantity, and duration of relief.1 24
They provide no limitation on the actual quality or character of the
relief granted. In fact, in the forty-one times the ITC has found in-
jury, 1 25 the President has only followed the ITC's recommendation
without deviation twice. 126 Although Congress retains some oversight
when the President deviates from the ITC's recommendation, 12 7 Con-
gress has little power to change the outcome.' 28
123 For example, any tariff cannot increase the existing duty by fifty percent, ad
valorem (e.g., if the existing duty is twenty-five percent, the total duty cannot exceed
seventy-five percent ad valorem after the President imposes a new tariff under section
201). Id. § 2253(e). Quantitative restrictions must allow, at a minimum, an amount of
the article equal to the quantity or value imported in the most recent three years
which are "representative of imports of such article" unless the President finds a dif-
ferent quantity or value is justified to "prevent or remedy the serious injury." Id. Ad-
ditionally, the relief is limited to four years, though the President may extend the
relief under certain circumstances. Id.
124 Id. § 2253(a).
125 See Steel, USITC Pub. 3479, Inv. No. TA-201-73 (Dec. 2001); Circular Welded
Quality Line Pipe, USITC Pub. 3261, Inv. No. TA-201-70 (Dec. 1999); Steel Wire Rod,
USITC Pub. 3207, Inv. No. TA-201-69 (July 1999); Lamb Meat, USITC Pub. 3176, Inv.
No. TA-201-68 (Apr. 1999); Views of the Commission on Injury, USITC Pub. 3088,
Inv. No. TA-201-67 (Mar. 1998); Broom Corn Brooms, USITC Pub. 2984, Inv. No. TA-
201-65 (Aug. 1996); Extruded Rubber Thread, USITC Pub. 2563, Inv. No. TA-201-63
(Dec. 1992); Christopher W. Derrick, Note, The Evolution of the Escape Clause: The
United States' Quest for Effective Relief from Fairly Traded Imports, 13 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 347, 365-71 (1988). This includes six cases in which the ITC was equally
divided over the question of injury. See Steel Wire Rod, supra; Extruded Rubber
Thread, supra; Derrick, supra, at 365-71.
126 See Proclamation No. 7529, 67 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (Mar. 5, 2002) (providing re-
lief for certain steel products); Proclamation No. 7274, 65 Fed. Reg. 9193 (Feb. 18,
2000) (providing relief for certain circular welded carbon quality line pipe); Procla-
mation No. 7273, 65 Fed. Reg. 8621 (Feb. 16, 2000) (providing relief for certain steel
wire rod); Proclamation No. 7214, 64 Fed. Reg. 42,265 (July 30, 1999) (providing
relief for lamb meat); Proclamation No. 7130, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,359 (May 30, 1998)
(providing relief for wheat gluten); Proclamation No. 6961, 61 Fed. Reg. 64,431 (Nov.
28, 1996) (providing relief for broom corn brooms); Derrick, supra note 125, at
365-71. This figure does not include cases in which the ITC was equally divided on
the question of injury and the President took no action.
127 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2253(b) (requiring the President to explain any deviation
from the ITC's recommendation or decision to take no action).
128 Section 2253(c) of Title 19 allows Congress to overrule the President's action if
it differs from the ITC's recommendation or if the President declines to take action
by passing a joint resolution. Of course, the President may veto the joint resolution,
which means that Congress must gather a two-thirds majority for anyjoint resolution.
Section 203 of the Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2253, originally allowed for a two-house
legislative veto. However, after the Supreme Court struck down the legislative veto in
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), Congress amended section 203 to remedy this
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2. Section 301: Enforcement of United States Rights Under
International Agreements
Section 301 of the Trade Act compliments section 201 by ensur-
ing that United States commerce receives the full benefit of interna-
tional agreements. Unlike section 201, section 301 focuses on the acts
of other nations. Actions taken under section 301 may be divided into
two categories: mandatory129 and discretionary. 130 This distinction fo-
cuses on when the USTR may or must act, not on how the USTR may
act.131
Under section 301, the USTR initiates an investigation into the
trade practices of another country upon petition by "any interested
party," 13 2 upon the USTR's own motion, or if the USTR identifies the
country as a "priority country. ' 13 3 The USTR is not required to initi-
ate an investigation in any of these circumstances, though when the
USTR determines not to initiate an investigation after receiving a peti-
tion, the USTR must make a formal determination, including the rea-
sons for the determination, and publish that determination in the
Federal Register. 134 Additionally, the USTR may only decline to initi-
ate an investigation into a "priority country" when the USTR deter-
mines such an investigation would be "detrimental to United States
economic interests."' 3 5
After initiating the investigation, the USTR will look into whether
1. the rights of the United States under any trade agreement are
being denied; 13 6 or
2. an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country violates, is inconsis-
tent with, or denies benefits under any trade agreement to which
the United States is a party or is an unjustified burden or restriction
on United States commerce; or' 37
3. "an act, policy, or practice of a foreign country is unreasonable or
discriminatory and burdens or restricts United States commerce,"
and action is appropriate.1 38
defect. See William E. Perry, Administration of Import Trade Laws by the United States Inter-
national Trade Commission, 3 B.U. INT'L L.J. 345, 375 n.138 (1985).
129 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a).
130 Id. § 2411(b).
131 Id. § 2411(c).
132 Id. § 2412(a).
133 Id. § 2412(b).
134 Id. § 2412(a) (3).
135 Id. § 2412(b) (2) (B).
136 Id. § 2411(a).
137 Id.
138 Id. § 2411(b).
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If the USTR makes either of the first two findings, this triggers
section 301's "mandatory action" provisions. The third finding trig-
gers section 301's "discretionary action" provisions. In either case, the
USTR's actions are subject to the President's specific direction. 139 In
case of the mandatory action, the USTR has additional discretion to
act if the USTR makes certain specific findings, including a finding
that the action would have a disproportionate adverse impact on the
United States economy or seriously harm national security interests.1 40
Regardless of whether the USTR's findings result in mandatory
or discretionary action, the USTR has discretion to determine the ex-
act action to take. For both mandatory and discretionary action, the
USTR has the same range of discretion.14' These actions include sus-
pending trade benefits under international agreements, imposing du-
ties or other import restrictions, and negotiating agreements with the
foreign country to eliminate the act or policy, eliminate the burden
created by the act or policy, or provide the United States with a com-
pensatory benefit.142 Unlike section 201, section 301 does not restrict
the magnitude or duration of the USTR's action, and, because section
301 subjects the USTR to the specific direction of the President, by
extension places no such limits on the President's actions.
B. The Ancillary Powers Test Applied
On the surface there would not appear to be any difference in
the amount of discretion provided under sections 201 and 301, both
in terms of how or when to act. In both cases, the Executive has al-
most unlimited authority to initiate an investigation. In both cases,
the Executive has virtually unlimited discretion when making the find-
ings necessary to take action. In both cases, the Executive has virtually
unlimited discretion when it chooses to act. Under the intelligible
principle test, it would seem that if one were to fail, both should fail.
However, as demonstrated below, by breaking from the intelligible
principle test's sole focus on the scope of discretion, and looking in-
stead at the quality or type of discretion within the larger framework
of independent executive power, the ancillary powers test provides a
measurable improvement over the intelligible principle test.
Sections 201 and 301 both involve one source of federal power:
the power of Congress to regulate foreign commerce. 143 If that were
139 Id. § 2411(a), (b).
140 Id. § 2411(a) (2) (B).
141 Id. § 2411(c) (1).
142 Id.
143 U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, ci. 3.
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the only source of federal power involved, then the outcome under
the ancillary powers test would come out no differently. Section 301,
however, involves a second source of federal power: the President's
foreign relations power. 144 In such cases, the President acts under the
combined authority of a plenary executive power as "the sole organ of
the federal government in ... international relations" 145 and pursuant
to Congress's plenary power to regulate international commerce, 146
personifying federal sovereignty and embodying the whole of federal
power.1 47 If the President lacks the authority in such a case then, it is
because the federal government itself lacks the power.
While all foreign trade may in some way affect foreign relations,
section 201's legislative history clearly shows that Congress intended
that section 201 relief would be isolated from foreign policy con-
cerns. 148 Thus, when the President acts under section 201, the Presi-
dent acts solely under the President's power to take care that the laws
of the United States be faithfully executed. 149 Section 201 is the prod-
uct of Congress's plenary power to regulate international trade. 150
When the President acts under section 201, the President acts solely
pursuant to delegated authority, and Congress, through its expressed
intent,1 5 1 has specifically placed this delegated authority outside of the
President's foreign affairs power.
Even if Congress had not specifically placed section 201 outside
the President's foreign relations power, it fails to invoke the power by
its own terms. Section 201 does not look at the actions of foreign
states. Determination of injury is based solely on finding such in-
creased imports of like or directly competitive articles as to substan-
tially cause serious injury or threat thereof to domestic industry. 152
These factors are solely domestic and bear no relation to conditions in
foreign countries or the actions of foreign governments. The driving
144 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)
(describing the President's international relations authority as plenary and exclusive).
145 Id. at 320.
146 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824).
147 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
148 S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 124 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186,
7268.
149 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
150 Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
151 S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 124, as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7268.
152 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (2000).
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purpose of section 201 is to provide relief against fairly traded goods;
no evidence of unfair trade practices is required for relief.153
Section 201 fails the ancillary powers test. It clearly involves the
exercise of legislative power which is not ancillary to an independent
executive power, and relief granted pursuant to section 201 fails to
satisfy the Bicameralism and Presentment Clauses, as well as the Origi-
nation Clause. 154
As discussed above, the President has virtually unfettered discre-
tion both when deciding whether to provide relief and what sort of
relief to provide.1 55 In such cases, the President acts as a legislator in
the true sense of the word. Under section 201, the President decides
to regulate in the first instance (when) and the nature of the regula-
tion (how). The lack of governing guiding principles and conflicting
standards not only fail to establish an identifiable congressional pol-
icy, but fail to establish criterion against which to measure the Presi-
dent's actions.
While these actions are clearly legislative, the ancillary powers test
requires further evaluation for independent executive authority. Al-
though tariffs and quotas necessarily implicate foreign relations to
some degree, such implication is not within the scope of the Presi-
dent's independent foreign relations powers. As discussed above, sec-
tion 201 is grounded in Congress's power to regulate international
commerce and does not implicate the President's power as the na-
tion's sole organ for international relations, namely the power to
speak and listen on behalf of the nation. 156 In that case, the only in-
dependent executive powers available are the Vesting and Take Care
Clauses.' 57
Section 201 clearly involves execution at the ITC level. Once a
proper request is made for the ITC to conduct an investigation, it
must act.158 The ancillary power test overcomes any lack of guidance
in terms of recommending relief because the recommendation is an-
cillary to the execution of the report. The President, on the other
hand, has complete discretion, both in terms of granting relief and
defining the remedy. 59 There is no independent executive authority
accompanying this absolute discretion which would provide an ancil-
153 See Kevin C. Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301 and the
Escape Clause: The Case for Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 127, 128 (1987).
154 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
155 See supra Part II.A.1.
156 See supra notes 144-51 and accompanying text.
157 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. § 3.
158 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (2000).
159 See supra notes 119-28 and accompanying text.
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lary power. For this reason, the President's role under section 201
fails the ancillary powers test.
Lastly, since section 201 does not depend on any action from
Congress and has the effect of enacting a tariff, quota, tariff-rate
quota, or any combination thereof, 60 it has the effect of enacting a
law. Because the relief and remedy are at the President's sole discre-
tion, section 201 does not protect against individual participants in
the lawmaking process from enacting statutes unilaterally.' 61 As a re-
sult, relief in the form of tariffs, quotas, or tariff-rate quotas fail to
satisfy the checks guaranteed under the Presentment and Bicamera-
lism Clauses. Relief in the form of tariffs and tariff-rate quotas also fail
to satisfy the Origination Clause, 162 since they do not even require
approval by the House of Representatives, let alone originate in it.
The Origination Clause itself serves an important, additional separa-
tion of powers function by ensuring not only that revenue measures
satisfy bicameralism and presentment, but that they originate in the
"people's House." Absent any ancillary, independent executive
power, section 201 must fail the ancillary powers test.
Section 301, on the other hand, survives the ancillary powers test,
despite its similar grant of power, because it does involve an ancillary
executive power: the President's foreign relations power. The presi-
dency derives its plenary power in international relations from its posi-
tion as the sole representative of the United States' external
sovereignty, and exclusive power to speak or listen on behalf of the
nation. 163 Unlike Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce,
this power is not derived from the Constitution, but from the Union
itself as the sovereign successor to the British Crown. 164 Federal
power to regulate international commerce, on the other hand, is de-
rived from the Constitution's enumerated powers. 165 The Constitu-
tion vests the absolute and plenary power to regulate international
commerce in Congress alone. 1 66
When the President acts under section 301 through the USTR,
the President acts both under the Vesting and Take Care Clauses and
under the President's independent foreign relations power. The Pres-
ident is then acting both as Congress's agent in executing its foreign
commerce policy and as an independent operator exercising the Pres-
160 19 U.S.C, § 2253(a).
161 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 427 n.12 (1998).
162 U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 1.
163 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317-20 (1936).
164 Id. at 316-17.
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
166 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824).
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ident's own foreign relations power. In essence, Congress gave the
President another "arrow" in the President's foreign relations quiver.
Section 201 relief, on the other hand, looks solely at domestic con-
cerns, and was clearly intended to be so limited. 167
CONCLUSION
While the Constitution certainly contemplates integration of the
powers of the separate branches of government, it also diffuses them
to protect liberty. 168 Separation of powers, though not indifferent to
efficiency, aims to protect against the arbitrary exercise of power; 169
the sort of exercise invited by wholesale delegation of power from one
branch to another. Where that delegation is accompanied by inde-
pendent sources of power, however, the risk of arbitrary exercise of
power is lessened, or is at least less troubling, as the power exercised
falls within the branch's institutional capacity-its constitutionally de-
fined sphere of power.
Unfortunately, the intelligible principle test, with its focus on the
quantity of discretion delegated rather than the nature of such discre-
tion, fails to properly account for the improper delegation of power.
By failing to incorporate broader separation of powers principles, the
intelligible principle test lost sight of the fundamental concern with
preventing arbitrary exercises of power. The intelligible principle
test, as it developed, forces courts to either accept limitless delegation
or violate separation of powers decisions itself by failing to afford
proper deference to coordinate branches of government.
The Court may revive the nondelegation by uniting its separation
of powers jurisprudence in the ancillary powers test. By adopting the
ancillary powers test, the Court would prevent wholesale delegation of
power while still allowing the integration of powers into a workable
government. At the same time, the ancillary powers test advances
other separation of powers concerns, such as judicially manageable
standards against which to measure executive action and respect for
coordinate branches of government. Lastly, the ancillary powers test
serves the public by shielding against arbitrary exercise of power.
As the discussion of sections 201 and 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
illustrates, the ancillary powers test is more than simply a restatement
167 S. REP. No. 93-1298, at 124 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186,
7268.
168 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson,J.,
concurring).
169 Id. at 613 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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of the intelligible principle test. It provides for maximum deference
while at the same time allowing for real limits to Congress's ability to
delegate power.
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